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Abstract

This project examines how we value future generations. From looking at different
ways we value future and present wellbeing we are able to see a tension that arises
from having a high value on both. When looking at examples of ways we value future
wellbeing we can see that if you value future wellbeing highly it will devalue current
wellbeing. Then we look for a justification for valuing one over the other. This leads us
into two ways of how we justify valuing either valuation of wellbeing and a discussion of
the average and the classical principles of utility. We come to the conclusion that the
average principle of utility should not be used and so explore the classical principle.
Through the classical principle we look at the repugnant conclusion and determine that
the rare disease problem is an instantiation of this conclusion. Through a framework of
how we value future wellbeing in the rare disease problem, we are able to use an
appeal to innovation to resolve the repugnant conclusion and thus have a justification
for valuing future wellbeing over present wellbeing.
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Glossary
●

Discounting/Discount rate - Discounting refers to a percentage of a separate
number. I use it in the context of discounting a cost as well as discounting
wellbeing. A helpful example if you are not used to it in this context is to think of a
similar situation of getting a piece of clothes at a discount. It is the percentage or
rate at which the price changed.

●

Rare diseases - Any disease with a population of under 200,000 people in the US.
However, I use this term and will often refer to very rare diseases with a much
smaller population as a rare disease.

●

Orphan diseases - This refers to diseases that are being ignored. In developed
countries, these are almost always rare diseases; however, it is not exclusive in
non-developed countries in that context.

●

Utilitarianism - This is the theory that actions are right if they promote the greatest
amount of happiness and should be a guiding principle of conduct.
○

The classical principle of utilitarianism. I refer to this as the sum principle
of utility as a statement of how to calculate that utility.

○

The average principle of utilitarianism. This refers to calculating the
average utility.

●

Wellbeing - This is a state of happiness and contentment.
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Introduction

The purpose of this project is to identify how we value future generations. A term
I use to be more specific about future generations and how that value manifests is
future wellbeing. When I say things along the lines of, valuing future wellbeing higher as
compared to lower, it can be useful to think of it as: to what extent is that future better or
worse off for the people who would live in it?
I will show different ways we can value future and current wellbeing and what
those ways imply. One of the implications that is elaborated on is that when we value
future wellbeing highly, it devalues the present wellbeing. We then explore justifications
for valuing future over present wellbeing and we look at some of the literature in
utilitarianism.
In 1928, Frank Ramsey published a paper in The Economic Journal in which he
discounted future enjoyments at zero. (Ramsey 543) Using a discount on future
enjoyment would be to value it less than present enjoyments. Not discounting it values
people’s future enjoyments the same as people’s present enjoyments. When I later refer
to Ramsey valuing future wellbeing highly it is in comparison to using any positive rate
when discounting future wellbeing. Ramsey also follows a classical utilitarian view of
calculating utility and so in order to figure out a justification for balancing how we view
future and current wellbeing we need to look at the shortcomings and paradoxes in the
classical principle of utilitarianism.
Derek Parfit, in his book Reasons and Persons, demonstrates paradoxical
thinking in the classical principle. He calls it ‘the repugnant conclusion’. The conclusion
is any loss in the quality of wellbeing in a population can be compensated for by a
9

sufficient gain in the quantity of that population. (Parfit 402) This conclusion comes from
the two common sense notions that life is worth living and that we should try to optimize
happiness. One of the methods Parfit uses to arrive at this repugnant conclusion is the
mere addition paradox, which is a step-by-step way of how we arrive at a world with
many unhappy people from a world with few happy people. The mere addition paradox
and the repugnant conclusion are problems for the classical principle of utilitarianism.
(Parfit 449)
The rare disease problem is an example of how we balance valuing future and
present wellbeing. This example of balancing future and present wellbeing is important
to understand as it is an instantiation of the repugnant conclusion and later shows how
to solve this paradox and find our justification for valuing future wellbeing. To simplify
that relation, innovation that happens at the expense of present wellbeing is in favor of
an increase to future wellbeing. From the way modern progress has permanence you
can end up with a situation where any loss in the quality of the current wellbeing can be
made up for with the amount of people you get to save in the future. The rare disease
problem gives us a framework for understanding a later transition to a resolution of the
repugnant conclusion.
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Chapter I, The Rare Disease Problem
The trouble with people who exist in the future
We are able to figure out how to value things in the future and what they mean
for us in the present. If we value future enjoyment highly, we might choose to prolong
our present enjoyment to achieve it. For example, if we choose to work an extra shift
which pays us ten dollars for one extra hour of overtime. We can use that ten dollars to
pay for two hours of happiness at an amusement park a few weeks in the future. This is
valuing that two hours of leisure at one hour of work. However, the value of that future
enjoyment can be independent of the dollar figure as people’s situation and income
change over time. If we begin to think about things much farther out than the two weeks
and add more people that value enjoyment differently. Then the larger amount will make
it more complex but many of the same principles as the amusement park can apply.
However, what if we try and value the future happiness of people who do not exist yet?
If we try to value that type of future happiness like the amusement park
happiness, we run into problems. One of them is that the amusement park situation
cannot scale in this way because we cannot know how people in the future will value
their enjoyment. Another problem is that we cannot value the future people's happiness
because we risk devaluing the happiness of the current generation. An example of this
scenario is working an extra hour to pay for an amusement park ticket that someone in
the future, we do not know, will use. It can feel almost nonsensical to have the people
give up their present happiness for someone’s happiness who does not exist yet. So,
how should we value future wellbeing? I begin by looking at the rare disease problem
and how we value future medicine and its future wellbeing.
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The rare disease problem
The drug creation system places a cost on current wellbeing in order to have an
increase in future wellbeing. That cost is being passed on to current wellbeing with
things such as patents and drug costs. This is aimed to increase wellbeing for the
distant future, like after a patent expires, but arguably diminishes the wellbeing of
current people.
To further understand this, we need to first understand what rare diseases are.
Simply put, they are a disease population where only a small number of people have
the disease. Their existence creates a problem as virtually no one wants to innovate for
a disease that affects only an extremely small amount of people.1 People are not able to
make money from it, so there is little motivation to search for cures or treatments in the
first place? One example of how we tried to get people to go after these ignored
diseases is the Orphan Drug Act. The act grants seven years of market exclusivity and
tax credits for up to half of the research and development costs. This hopes that high
incentives bring about innovation into these small populations of diseases that are being
ignored. (Yin 1060)
The Orphan Drug act, from a pure innovation standpoint, was a success:
companies now fund trials for what were previously lost causes. (Yin, 1073) The Orphan
Drug Act and patents are examples of incentives that values people's future wellbeing to
a high degree. The downside to this is the negative effects on current wellbeing:
monopolies that induce high prices. There are many examples of this: a treatment for

1

Rare diseases are classified as a disease population under 200,000. When I say an extremely small
amount, I am referring to situations like orphan diseases where there is such a small amount of people
that it is ignored.
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Gaucher disease costs around one hundred and fifty thousand dollars; Soliris costs
between two hundred thousand and four hundred thousand dollars. Health insurance
companies usually tolerate the burden of these cost. The person being treated pays a
minute fraction while the insurance companies cover the whole cost. This relationship
exists so that the cost to the current wellbeing is not unbearable. However, because of
the incentives it is lowering the wellbeing of the current population in exchange for
future wellbeing. The current generation has to trade-off between lower prices and
fewer rare disease treatments or higher prices and more rare disease treatments.
Rare diseases now make up a significant portion of the drug industry in the US.
The US has outshined other countries in new drug creation. (Keyhani, et al, 2010) A
system that does not hold those same incentives could lose that type of innovation.
However, could we see that as being better? If we take the view that future wellbeing
should be thought of highly and the corresponding view that innovation must be kept,
then this system is good for society. What if the level of innovation was lowered? Then
this would require people with those life-threatening diseases to be asked to prolong a
potential treatment. Implying their wellbeing has a lower value placed on them. This is a
deadly trade-off in which it can seem that neither outcome is preferable. In this situation,
the future wellbeing of these small populations is being pitted against our current
wellbeing. From this example we can see how we view future and current wellbeing and
their relation to one another. Incentives are an example of a distinct view of future
wellbeing and show how we balance these values.
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Incentives and systems as different ways to value the future
Valuing future wellbeing highly in a capitalist system allows for innovations in
things that seemingly require it. For industries like environmental and energy industries,
the valuing of future wellbeing can be looked at similarly to medicine. If we are to get out
of a problem like climate change, innovation is necessary. This can be used as another
example of valuing future wellbeing highly in order to innovate into wellbeing.
Innovation leaves a bunch of opportunities for things to be improved. As soon as
innovation happens, there should be a rush to improve as many lives as possible with it.
That statement can be seen as a loaded statement as improvement and possibility are
two things with large variability. There is also the absence of failure in that statement.
Failure can be thought of as opposed to success. This can be useful when thinking
about how we can define or measure innovation. It will also help us think about how
innovation happens and how an idea can turn into something that improves lives.
The attitudes towards future generations can help us figure out how we justify
valuing future wellbeing and present wellbeing at the same time. The rare disease
problem is an example of privileging the future population, arguably, at a cost of the
current population’s wellbeing. We can have a visceral disagreement with the level of
innovation and also have conflicting values of future and present wellbeing.
The problem of people having conflicting values for future generations is not set
to any one system it is innate as the perspective stems from us. Different social systems
can have incentives systems that produce different values on future people. If society's
priority favors the current generations, then the incentives will match those with lower
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costs. So, in a system with socialized medicine or a centralized system, the cost will be
lower on the current generation without the same incentives.
Innovation starts by people putting resources into projects for some sort of future
wellbeing. If there are less incentives for these projects then there are less active
resources, capital as an example, for these projects. How important is active capital in
innovation? By definition, a centralized system or government restricts expendable
capital, which is an incentive for invention, therefore minimizing reasons to innovate.
Acting capital is directly connected to the speed at which people or a system innovates.
(Solow 10,11) This is the intrinsic difference between a centralized and a decentralized
economy or, in other words, a question of who has the money. 2 For innovation to
happen under a decentralized system, the trust of other intentions and values needs to
happen. (Kotz, p10). A capitalist system can operate as a trustless system not requiring
the need to depend on others values. Trust, in that way, will always be uncertain; so a
trustless system has been the most compatible to date for incentivizing innovation and
valuing future generations more highly. However even in a system that is more
compatible with valuing the future generations highly we can still have conflicting values
of future wellbeing.
The problem of having different values for future generations can be seen inside
our industries. We can change our value of future wellbeing for different industries
which seem problematic. It seems problematic as it is the same as stating that different
human beings and their wellbeing should be valued differently based on nothing except
their proximity to the desired industry. If we do that, different future people will matter

2

It seems again like the rare disease problem is inescapable if you value future wellbeing in this way.
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more than others, and there is no real basis for that claim. Why should the person who
will die one hundred years from now of a disease be valued less than a person who will
die one hundred years from now of something else? If the current cost is similar and we
can innovate into both, shouldn't their future wellbeing be valued similarly if not the
same? Can there be a set of rules that can be applied to figuring out different peoples'
wellbeing, or must they be valued the same? It seems like some level of consistency is
necessary when valuing future wellbeing. However, if people can value the current
generation over the future generation, they will not be able to escape the rare disease
problem.3 Valuing the current generation over the future means lowering incentives that
are burdening current generations. These different values create a philosophical
problem of how we value future generations compared to the present generation.

3

If we take the inverse for these industries and disincentivize innovation, then presumably the cost on
current wellbeing will go down. This would mean however those insurance companies would cover drugs
at a lower cost and energy sectors would not need changing. This would alleviate the burden on current
generations and current wellbeing while accounting for future wellbeing at a lower value. This also seems
to have a host of problems, the most preventable of which is the inability to innovate out of problems. The
idea of not innovating, however, is not totally without support.

16

Chapter II, Valuing Future Generations

Innovation and Medicine

Innovation is important for figuring out how to balance valuing future wellbeing as
it is a method for escaping the rare disease problem as well as an example of how we
value future wellbeing. An invention, which we will discuss more on this later, is a point
in time in which new ideas create something that has not existed before. Invention
always comes before innovation. Valuing innovation, then, is, in turn, valuing future
inventions. Incentives on invention around rare diseases are one method for escaping
the rare disease problem.
When we value future people to a high degree, we are able to have our actions
today reflect our valuation of them. So, if we decide to spend less money in one area, it
reflects our value of future people and vise versa. For rare disease populations, their
disease will continue within them, and in a lot of cases, they will pass on the disease to
their children. There are future populations who will get the disease, and if the world
population continues to grow, so will that disease population. If the future people who
have the disease are valued highly, then that tells us we should do something that will
result in them getting treatment or a cure.
One mode of thinking is that the consequences of innovation are worth the
incentives to achieve them. That the cost to improve future people’s wellbeing are worth
the potential expense to current wellbeing. Patents are a way that we show this. The
idea behind a patent is that if you figure out something that no one else has done before
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(like a cure or treatment for a disease), then you own it, and no one can copy what you
have done for period of time. When the patent expires, anyone can create that thing.
Patents prioritize the immediate creation of new ideas and things. The creation of that
thing is prioritized over the general unauthorized use by anyone who did not create it.
This is an incentive that places a high value on people in the future; it assumes that the
benefit of having innovation happens now rather than later and will help most people.
Patents are an attempt to spur and create innovation.
A famous invention and innovation we should discuss is the discovery of
penicillin or antibiotics. When this is put in different contexts for wellbeing the example
showcases different perspectives on how we can view future and current wellbeing.
Without antibiotics, we would not be at the population size we are today. If you had to
choose between a world where there is a rapid discovery of new things like penicillin or
one where there is a slow discovery of things like penicillin, the initial reaction is to
choose the world with rapid development. In general, patents and incentives attempt to
choose that first world and speed up the discoveries and thus set our own pace on
innovation. This tells us that inventions like penicillin and towards similar outcomes can
be seen as trying to increase wellbeing.
In the context of future people and their wellbeing, penicillin was discovered in
1928, which is ninety-two years ago. As for us today, who were future people in 1928,
we received an immense benefit from antibiotics, and so it is easy for us to use that time
scale to view the benefits to our generation. We are the future generation of 1928, and
we want the invention of penicillin and all the benefits from that. We were their future
generation, and so our future generation would likewise want invention and its benefit. It
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becomes more difficult to look forwards instead of backward; however, the same
principles of the past are transitive; it is just that they are uncertain. What can be
transitive is understanding invention as a benefit to future generations and rapid
discovery is preferred to non-rapid discovery 4, and innovation is an attempt to have
rapid discoveries benefiting future generations.
The idea that discovery can be a consequence of self-interest can be inferred
from how we act when thinking about profits in a market-based system. Operating in a
capitalist society or, more specifically, the private sector is primarily about creating value
for other people, and through creating value for other people, you make a profit. What is
noteworthy about this is that value creation comes before profit. The profit is in
exchange for the value that was created. So, to benefit themselves, i.e., make a profit,
they first must create value for others. (Mackey, p22) If someone tries to benefit
themselves and increase their current wellbeing, they must do so in a way that also
creates value for others.
Furthermore, placing incentives to increase the benefit to oneself should,
therefore, increase the benefits of others. So by placing incentives to profit, an
innovation that comes with creating value can benefit others and the self. If we begin to
think about this temporally, we can say that the benefit sooner is better than later. If you
can knowingly benefit someone sooner (and yourself) without a downside, you would
rather do it sooner than later. However, what about the opportunity cost? What if we
add some consequences to innovation, like the diversion of resources from other
things? If you value future people highly, the answer has to be yes as the benefit of

4

Assuming no harm in rapid discovery; we will discuss that later.
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something like penicillin existing is better sooner rather than later. We can say that
bettering people’s lives can be an outcome of innovation over time.
Continuing with the sentiment of opportunity cost, consider that innovation
devalues the lives of people currently alive. Penicillin didn’t have any immediate effect
or uses in 1929 and has been much more valuable in the last seventy years. If we value
current generations as not the candidates to benefit from the innovations, there is a real
devaluation of the current generation. In 1928 there were about two billion people;
today; there are nearly eight billion people. Would we have been right in valuing the
people of 2020 the same as the people of 1928 during 1928? 5 If in 1928 we thought
there would be eight billion people by 2020 and we valued them highly, how would we
go about doing that? If each person in 2020 has the current value of one-fourth, both
populations would be equal in value. If we value them high, there is an innate risk of
devaluing the current generation. There are negative consequences to this as (if we
take it to the extreme) someone who lives only for the future generations has little
incentives to innovate. However, if there was some balance between them, they would
enjoy things benefiting them currently. So, the dichotomy of valuing future people higher
or lower is more or less a false one as we cannot practically live in or get to either
extreme of a valuation. We need a method to justify valuing future people’s wellbeing
high or low which utilitarianism will be able to help us with.

5

Assuming that everyone's value is one and so equal.
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Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism can provide us with a possible justification for valuing future
wellbeing over present wellbeing. Utilitarianism is a doctrine of trying to maximize
happiness. If something increases the happiness of a lot of people, under utilitarianism
it is seen as a good. When something increases the happiness for a large number of
people and lowers the happiness for only a few; if the overall happiness is increased
than it is good.6 So, when you discuss innovation, rare diseases, and all the things that
those ideas have to do with, you’re talking about figuring out the overall happiness;
these determinations can sometimes be murky. The kind of ambiguity of determining
the overall is what leads to differing opinions, in other words, how we ought to go about
calculating maximum happiness. However, if we can determine that an increase in
happiness is a good, then there is a path to a real ethical defense based on
utilitarianism. The average principle of utility is one method of solving how we should
value future wellbeing. What utilitarianism allows us to do is to criticize valuing future
generations highly and also allow for a high value based on if it increases overall
happiness. If we are able to determine an overall increase in happiness than we have a
utilitarian justification for valuing future wellbeing highly. First, we need to figure out
what principle we should use for the maximizing of happiness.
Sikora deals with the differences between the classical principle and the average
principle and how we understand the key concept of maximizing overall utility. The
difference is in the calculation of utility. The classical principle takes the sum of all the

6

Overall refers to a calculation made of whatever maximizes happiness. For example, you can calculate
what increases happiness overall based on the per person average or a sum of all the happiness.
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happiness that is produced by people as the calculation for how we should increase
happiness.7 The average principle takes the sum of all the happiness produced by
people and then divides it by the number of people to get an average happiness for
each person. The difference is a calculation to determine the most overall utility and in
our case wellbeing. The average principle is the view that you should do what will bring
about the greatest possible average happiness level.” Rawls, Rescher, and Broad
regard the average principle as superior to the classical principle, and there are
considerable grounds for supposing that Mill accepted the average principle.” (Sikora,
409)
One case Sikora brings when discussing how the difference manifests is a
couple deciding whether to have two children or six. Whether there are two or six will
impact the lives and expected happiness of the children:
Consider the following case. A couple is deciding whether
to have two children or six. Whether there are two or six they
might expect to have much more happiness than unhappiness in
their lives. But if there are two children, let us assume that their
average level of happiness would be slightly higher than it would
be if there were six children. If these were the only two
alternatives, and the question was to be decided in terms of the
children’s welfare, I would suppose that the parents should have
six children. But if additional alternatives were possible, I might
hold that a trade-off would be in order. It might be the case that
they should do something that would neither maximize the
average level of happiness of the children nor bring about the
greatest excess of happiness over unhappiness – that neither
the classical nor the average principle should be followed.
(Sikora 412)
Sikora, in this situation of a couple deciding between two or six children, is able to
distinguish the key conceptual difference between the average principle and the sum
principle. If you assume that the two children would have slightly higher levels of
7

I prefer to refer to it as the sum principle when discussing it in relation to the average principle.
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average happiness compared to the six then according to the average principle you
should choose two children. However according to the sum principle, the six children
option would have the highest sum happiness and so the choice would be six children in
that situation. He then explains that if we add the six children’s happiness levels and the
sum is slightly greater than the two children’s happiness level, if comparing each child,
the six children would have one third the happiness. So, if we average out the two
children’s happiness, we would prefer the average instead of the greater: “In the case in
question, I would suppose that the parents should follow the average principle and only
have two children.” (Sikora 412)
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Rejecting the average principle of utilitarianism
Do these principles apply or even help us think about future generations? Even in
the case of the sum or average happiness, there is still little talk of future happiness. For
example, I would suppose that if future happiness is greater than current happiness,
you could justify the greater amount of happiness under both the average and the sum
principle. So, we should review Sikora’s distinctions to find where the distinctions
manifest in the case of happiness over time. Consider Sikora’s previous case when you
have the decision of two against six children. If we give Sikora the averaging principle
and then suppose that the two children have a greater amount of average happiness at
the beginning of their childhood, but their overall happiness remains the same
throughout their lives, we would say that the six children have less average happiness
initially but eventually surpass it based on their average happiness. Should we consider
the higher average in the future and so choose six children instead of two? There is a
time variation between the two, so there should be a time value of happiness. There are
certain problems that come up with using the average principle over time which leads us
to not view future wellbeing through the average principle. However, first we need to
understand more about how the average principle plays out.
Many arguments can be used to say it’s more than possible for the six children to
be happier in the long run. For example, more siblings to grow with and play with means
greater chances of happiness, or having a sibling causes happiness, so more will cause
more. The argument does not make a difference if you concede that there is a
possibility for a variation of happiness based on different periods.
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The difference between the two options of children’s happiness becomes
drastically large when looked at through the sum principle- to the point where if the
average of the six children ever matches the two children with happiness levels, then
the sum difference would be three times as large.8 So, if there was a situation in which
the average happiness would, in the future, meet with the two children’s happiness, the
sum happiness at the time of the increase would have to be two hundred percent
greater than the happiness of the two children. This drastic difference is not an
oversight in the average principle because it is the desired outcome.
If taken to extremes, the average happiness of two people can be extremely high
and still preferable to a population with less average happiness but more people. It
seems like the correction to this extreme would be, at some point, to consider the sum
principle. The two should not be mutually exclusive.9 10
At some point, we should distinguish between the farthest average happiness
and the closest. The people who make the decisions based on the average principle are
the parents of the children; if the point at which the average happiness of the six
children becoming greater than the two is very far out in the future; then it is
unreasonable to expect them to pick an option that is far out into the future. The
reasoning for their perspective could be that it is so far out, and they could no longer be
here to experience it. However, if the inflection point happens within the next year then
even though the two children are born with a greater average level of happiness which

8

You get when you revert the average to sum for the two children at the point the six children reach the
same average happiness the two children have.
9
The extreme of the sum principle is the repugnant conclusion, which is discussed more later .
10
Perhaps a new principle of discounting the sum happiness would be better.
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the six will overcome, it is reasonable to assume that they would choose the six over the
two if they choose on averaging happiness.
There needs to be some method of recognizing a distinction between future and
current happiness. Parfit recognizes that a discount rate has been used for trying to
value effects on future people.
Some writers claim that, while we ought to be concerned
about effects on future people, we are morally justified in
being less concerned about effects in the further future. This
is a common view in welfare economics, and cost-benefit
analysis. On this view, we can discount the more remote
effects of our acts and policies, at some rate of n per cent per
year. This is called the Social Discount Rate. (Parfit, p. 357)
In theory this would make it so that each year in the future the level of happiness or
welfare would go down an increasing amount. The further in the future that happiness
is; the more it gets discounted thus making the difference between the original level and
the discounted time dependent. A discount rate with utilitarianism has the potential to
justify valuing either future wellbeing or current wellbeing over one another.
The initial problem with discounting the average each year is that the average
does not consider the number of people. If we have an average level of ten and
discount it for one year, it will be less than the one year even though it will not have
overcome the other ten. This is an issue in averaging; it is logical to revert to the sum
principle in some situations. For example, what would be the decision, and how would it
be made, when the parent realizes that the average happiness of the six and two are
the same? They would ultimately choose based on the number of children and not the
average because the happiness level is the same. There is a reversion back to the sum
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principle. It is not pragmatic to expect those parents to be indifferent. This problem also
happens when you compare the average happiness of the future people and it is equal
to the current average happiness level. You revert to the base of the sum principle and
undo the calculation you did for the average principle. So, if the average discounted
amount of future happiness is not vastly different from a present average happiness, for
the two children, then we can assume there is reversion back to the sum principle. To
not revert back; we would have to consciously ignore other human life and internally
value the slight increase in average happiness to such an extreme where I believe it to
be unrealistic.
Additionally, valuing the future based on the average principle can also have
foolish conclusions. Parfit understands this and writes a scenario which illustrates this
point.
How Only France Survives. In one possible future, the worst-off people in
the world soon start to have lives that are well worth living. The quality of
life in different nations then continues to rise. Though each nation has its
fair share of the world’s resources, such things as climate and cultural
traditions give to some nations a higher quality of life. The best-off people,
for many centuries, are the French. In another possible future, a new
infectious disease makes nearly everyone sterile. French scientists
produce just enough of an antidote for all of France’s population. All other
nations cease to exist. This has some bad effects on the quality of life for
the surviving French. Thus there is no new foreign art, literature, or
technology that the French can import. These and other bad effects
outweigh any good effects. Throughout this second possible future the
French therefore have a quality of life that is slightly lower than it would be
in the first possible future. (Parfit, 421)
Based off of these two worlds and all the people in them, the average principle would
dictate that the second world is better because it has a higher average quality of life.
The billions of people in the first world are worse off for many centuries before they get
better. If the billions of people never lived, then the average quality of life would be
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better for the French. It would even be worse if those people lived because the French
have a higher average now rather than before. This conclusion by the average principle
is of course foolish; however, it goes to show why we think it is foolish and it is because
of the billions of people who are not in existence.11 We internally revert to the sum
principle when we consider the glaring difference between the two worlds, the number
of people. We cannot value future generations in any way under the average principle,
because of its tendency and likely potential to ignore human life.
Sikora brings up another example of the average principle and discusses an
individual who can raise the average happiness to a higher level (Sikora 416). We can
extend this argument: if there was the possibility of creating a future person that would
bring the average happiness to an extreme amount of average happiness, then what
obligation do we have to bring about that future happiness? What if, in doing so, we
bring down the average happiness of people alive today to bring this person into
existence? If there is no obligation to future happiness, then the average principle would
be us trying to maximize the average happiness for only people who exist or whose
existence is inevitable. However, no one’s existence in the future is inevitable. This cuts
both ways, so the possibility of this mythical person should be recognized and
accounted for in the average principle. So, we cannot look at a discounted value for
future wellbeing through the average principle. If there is a way of discounting wellbeing
under the sum principle, then there is a justification for valuing future wellbeing over
current wellbeing.

11

Parfit refers to this conclusion of the average principle as an absurd conclusion. (Parfit 449)
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Frank Ramsey
Frank Ramsey used the sum principle when viewing future wellbeing. He put
forth an equation for optimum saving while trying to figure out how much income a
nation should save. Ramsey differentiates between discounting money and discounting
future utilities or wellbeing. The distinction between the two is that wellbeing changes
based on our enjoyment of money. (Ramsey 1928, 553) We can say that our rate of
discount of our wellbeing influences our rate at discounting money. If the rate
discounting our enjoyment is zero, then it is “independent of the value of [the rate for
future sums of money].” Ramsey 1928 p554) This distinction is shown by how Ramsey
does not discount future enjoyment.
One point should perhaps be emphasized more particularly;
it is assumed that we do not discount later enjoyments in
comparison with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically
indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the
imagination. (Ramsey p553)
To Ramsey the devaluing of someone’s future wellbeing is indefensible. Ramsey does
not use a formula to discount future enjoyments. He uses a classical utilitarian approach
and calculates the sum of utilities over generations. Ramsey calculated optimum
savings with a discount rate, however, that formula is only used for that and not future
enjoyments. The discount rate for optimum saving was the discount rate approaching
zero over an infinite time. (Ramsey 553–555)
Wellbeing not being discounted when viewed from the present moment has been
a particular part of Ramsey that has been debated among philosophers and economists
alike. However, it leads to an interesting way of valuing future wellbeing. Robert Solow,
an economist, agrees with Ramsey. Solow wrote responding to Ramsey,
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“In social decision making, however, there is no excuse
for treating generations unequally, and the time-horizon
is, or should be, very long. In solemn conclave
assembled, so to speak, we ought to act as if the social
rate of time preference were zero.” (Solow 9)
If wellbeing is discounted at a positive rate, then we inherently discount that wellbeing to
a lesser extent because the discount percentage is positive. If the rate is zero it leaves
an interesting way to value future wellbeing that does not diminish their wellbeing
whatsoever. When using a discount rate above zero we treat future generations
unequal from our own. This way of valuing future people is a method in the sum
principle of utilitarianism and can be seen as a way of calculating maximum happiness.
This method is preferred to the average principle
Frank Ramsey’s discount rate of zero has implications for the rare disease
problem. When you value a rare disease population highly, the prices around the drug
are high. If there are only one thousand people with the disease, it requires a
disproportionately high cost to develop the drug, and in order for that drug to be
developed, the people will be charged highly. However, no one will have the amount
required that is to be charged. Insurance companies come in to pay those high prices.
When these low populations and high-priced drugs get developed, they increase the
cost on everyone. So, you have a situation where, when you value people highly, it
lowers the wellbeing of other people. If we use the sum principle of utilitarianism then
we can say that if some people become slightly less happy in order to make people very
happy, then this is a good under this principle. Our previous initial concern when valuing
future wellbeing is that it devalues the current generation in favor of future generations.
If the current generation has to decrease their wellbeing in order to have a huge
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increase in wellbeing in the future than this can be seen as a good. However, there are
some problems that come into being when using a classical utilitarian approach.
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Chapter III, The Repugnant Conclusion and its instantiations

The repugnant conclusion

The repugnant conclusion shows a paradox in utilitarianism; it is the extreme of
the classical principle of utilitarianism. Trying to optimize happiness when a population
is growing with unhappy people is shown to be incompatible by Parfit. At its core, the
repugnant conclusion starts with two utilitarian ideas that are common sense notions:
that we should make the world a better place and that life is worth living. These two
ideas are at odds and show an extreme disconnect between what we think should
happen and what is actually happening. The clearest way of arriving at the repugnant
conclusion is through the mere addition paradox. This starts with one population, call it
World A, that is extremely happy; we then consider a second population. In the second,
world A+, we have an increased number of people; however, a decrease in the
happiness for those additional people. If we are under the assumption that life is worth
living, this addition is not worse than A.
We then can optimize the happiness and get a new world, world B, in which the
happiness of the first population is slightly lower, but the total happiness is higher. This
is done with the notion that we should make the world a better place. Now we have a
world which is better than world A+. If we repeat this process with B and B+ and do C,
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then C+ and D. We will arrive at the repugnant conclusion: a world in which there is
greater total happiness but the people in that world are pretty much miserable. (Parfit
419) The very name of it shows the distress you have when looking at the repugnant
conclusion because, how can a world with many extremely unhappy people be better
than a world with few very happy people? It goes against the same intuition that put
forth the two assumptions, to begin with.

There is a utilitarian population problem here. There are other ways to arrive at
this repugnant conclusion. Another interesting way is through the contemplation of
future people, particularly through two scenarios. First, a pregnant mother suffers from
sickness- and if she goes through simple treatment, the treatment will cause her child to
suffer a permanent handicap; if she receives the treatment, the child will be cured and
perfectly normal. The second situation: a woman suffers from sickness, and if she gets
pregnant while she is sick, her child will suffer from a permanent handicap whereas, if
she postpones her pregnancy a few months, she will recover, and the child will be born
perfectly normal. (Parfit 375, 376, 378) These two situations have the potential to
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produce two distinguishably different people. What seems like the common-sense
solution, to wait out in both cases, also leads to the repugnant conclusion. The waiting
implies that any loss in the quality of lives in a population can be compensated for by a
sufficient gain in the quantity of a population, like a woman taking on the illness and
thus a loss in quality in order to have her child born. (Parfit 381, 382) This is a problem
in the classical principle of utilitarianism and could mean that the sum principle, like the
average principle, can meet a tragic fate.
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How a repugnant conclusion becomes a repugnant instantiation
The rare disease problem is population Z. Both are results of outcomes in which
we want to make the world a better place and also believe that life is worth living. In
order to make the world a better place and help these people who had rare diseases,
this set high incentives for creating a treatment or drug for a rare disease.12 Similarly, in
the repugnant conclusion’s mere addition paradox optimizing happiness was the
reasoning for the quality of life to drop. Life is worth living is essential in both cases as it
is the whole reason that the mere addition paradox continues. Likewise, it is also the
reason for having incentives for invention.
If, for example, there were only one disease that we could potentially have, then
we would focus our efforts on that disease, no matter the population of healthy people
or people who have the disease. If we then add another disease (and we start with the
same assumptions of the repugnant conclusion; that life is worth living and we should
optimize happiness), we are now going to figure out which disease we should work on
curing. If we start adding more diseases, we begin to see a problem with selecting
which disease to go after first.13
Now let’s assume that we get to choose which diseases to tackle. Under the
same assumptions (life is worth living and maximizing happiness), we would choose the
diseases that has the greatest negative effect. This would allow us to try and maximize
the total number of people whom we can treat and whose lives we can make better.

12
13

The orphan drug act for example.
Assuming all the disease populations are relatively the same.
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When we choose this route, we create a logical hierarchy of what diseases
should be solved and in what order. However, there is a problem with this: the diseases
at the bottom of the hierarchy are not a priority. This means that in the absence of a
large population, the disease will not get cured. If a world has one actor who chooses
what to go after and they have the choice to try and cure one disease with a population
of three or three diseases with the combined population of the three (each having one),
they will choose the singular disease because they are trying to maximize people they
can treat. Meanwhile, they would have to go one by one for the other three diseases
with the same population. This gets to such an extreme that we know how to cure
diseases, but they are not worth the effort to tackle. This is an instantiation of the mere
addition paradox and the repugnant conclusion. If this conclusion is one that has to be
made by classical utilitarian’s then it can seem like there is no justification in valuing
future wellbeing this way.
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Another instantiation
Another example which is useful to look at is insurance, as it is also a conflict of
the two notions that set up the mere addition paradox.14 The rise of insurance allowed
incentives and high prices to be where they are in healthcare and, in a sense, lowered
quality of life for healthy people. If they are healthy, they will never need health
insurance but still have to pay for it however they will only be certain of their health in
the future. Health insurance can be thought of as a pool of money that everyone pays
into and then when they get sick you get to withdraw from that pool to pay for a service.
It is a way to insure the payment of healthcare services. Health insurance acts as a
middleman between what the doctor charges and what someone pays.
Zolgensma, a treatment for a fatal muscle wasting disease that kills children in
infancy, cost over two million dollars for the one-time treatment. Health insurance
companies step in and absorb the cost of these high-cost drugs. (Tozzi 1) The reason
the drug company is able to charge that much is by charging these pools of money, aka
insurance companies. This creates an ability for a small disease to have an untreated
market and thus a motivator for drug companies to figure out a way to treat that market.
The insurance population can also be an instantiation of the population Z of the
mere addition paradox and so an instantiation of a problem in utilitarianism. When we
start from the same place of no diseases, then there is no insurance necessary to cover
them because there are no illnesses. Suppose that we then add an illness into the world
that only a portion of the population has. If we try and maximize happiness, then we
want to help those people with that illness. If the society is set up in the hierarchy and

14

Understanding these examples will help us understand the potential solution.
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the disease is random in who gets it, then insurance would be a way of maximizing
happiness. The people who need treatment would get incentives for treatment as
insurance makes more expensive medicine affordable and creates a bigger market for
the treatment of that disease. Suppose we keep adding diseases into the world and
expand the coverage of this insurance. So, one way or another, everyone pools their
money with the expectation that, when they get sick, they will be cared for with the help
of insurance. With each new additional treatment and coverage to the system, more and
more money needs to be pooled to cover expenses making the premiums go up for
each individual. This decreases the amount of money per healthy person and spends it
on the person with the disease. This line of logic can continue until we get to a
population Z of this world where everyone pays highly into the system to support the
few, rare, and expensive diseases.15 Understanding these two examples will deepen
our understanding of why we should accept the repugnant conclusion.

15

A benefit of this is that the innovation can be at an all-time high because a drug's price can be inflated a
seemingly infinite amount. However, the amount everyone would have to pay into the insurance pool of
money would have to go up. You are decreasing the quality of life for everyone who does not have a
disease.
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Rejecting the solutions to the mere addition paradox and the
repugnant conclusion.

One solution, which we reject, is to value what the world is better based on the
least happy people. This would stop the mere addition paradox at A+ because A+ is not
better than A as A is the new baseline for valuing the world, and it is less than it was
before. Similarly, the average principle of utilitarianism is a solution. If you take the
average happiness of world A then you would not think that world A+ or world B is
preferable to A as they have average happiness’s that are lower than A. This solution
would take into account the needs of the current generation much more than future
people as it is judging welfare from the least happy people. This would value future
people low. However, this is a bit odd as tension comes when you apply this to the rare
disease problem. You would tell the rare disease people that life is not worth living
because you can’t put the incentives in place to value their future wellbeing. This implies
that with this solution, life is not worth living and so breaks one of the original notions of
the paradox. It changes a core assumption to the repugnant conclusion to say life is not
worth living, which seems nonsensical. While stating life is not worth living as a solution
is not the worst idea and does resolve the tension, it also eliminates any concern with
any assumption or arrivals at the repugnant conclusion. There would be no reason to
optimize happiness as life is not worth it. (Anglin 754) If we can fix this classical
utilitarian paradox then we have a framework for balancing valuing future wellbeing to
current wellbeing.

39

Chapter IV, Innovation

A real solution to the repugnant conclusion
I want to explore a solution that does not require a break from the two original
notions that sets up the repugnant conclusion. Every other solution breaks at least one
of the initial notions, that we want to optimize happiness and think that life is worth
living. In order to do that we should understand how we escape one of the repugnant
conclusion’s instantiations and how we value future and current wellbeing. Then we can
properly solve the repugnant conclusion.
New medicine that has been discovered has the potential to increase future
wellbeing at an exponential rate if we assume population growth over an infinite time.
So, the wellbeing of a new medicine that is discovered has the potential to increase
drastically and indefinitely over long periods of time. Arguably these discoveries become
extremely valuable to wellbeing, and in retrospect, worth the incentives used to bring
the discovery into being.
If we assume that a drug is a perpetual wellbeing asset for a disease population,
then we can use thinking similar to Ramsey to show how we might think about the rare
disease population. A perpetual wellbeing asset is a thing that, once it is made, sets a
base level of wellbeing for those people to be increased. So, if a disease that didn’t
have a treatment or research suddenly gets a treatment, then that sets a level of
wellbeing for that disease population. If people know that something is effective, and
that knowledge is now available indefinitely, it’s a new step so to speak that people can
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stand on. So, when a treatment gets made for a population that didn’t have treatment
previously, that drug indefinitely benefits the wellbeing of that population. Even if a
company were to stop making the drug, the knowledge of its effectiveness still effects
the wellbeing of that population. Now, if we begin to look at things through a long
timeline, perhaps even indefinitely, then the creation of these drugs sets a base level of
understanding for that disease and that population associated with it.
Once the cat (research or drug) is out of the bag, it cannot be put back in. Once a
drug is created for a disease population, it affects not only everyone who has that
disease but also everyone who will have that disease in the future. The wellbeing it
creates today will continue into the future, but to an even greater amount because there
can be indefinite population growth over extremely long periods.
These perpetual wellbeing assets fit nicely into Ramsey’s thinking. His equation
to value future wellbeing will not go positive: the enormous amount of future wellbeing
that creating a drug contains, will not be discounted. So, if we consider the future
wellbeing of people under Ramsey’s framework, drug creation is critical for an indefinite
increase to wellbeing.
If we use Ramsey’s no positive discount when valuing future wellbeing and so
value future wellbeing highly, then it seems reasonable to assume that the sooner we
discover new medicine, the better.
You can argue that If we don’t value future wellbeing at a positive discount rate
and set it at zero, then there becomes little reason to go after an indefinitely increasing
population of wellbeing because, as long as that indefinitely increasing future happens
and wellbeing does get discovered, then there is no urgency. If you have two of the

41

same infinitely increasing wellbeing events, then their value can be argued to be the
same, under Ramsey. For example, there is no difference between an event onehundred years out that increases future wellbeing for everyone forever and the same
event one-hundred and ten years out. There is no difference in value if you value future
wellbeing the same. You cannot discount indefinitely with a zero discount rate. One
solution is to use a negative discount rate. This would increase the value of future
wellbeing year over year, making the one-hundred-year option more preferable than the
one-hundred-and-ten-year one. So, there is reasoning for urgency and as shown, a
greater increase in wellbeing with the increasing perpetual wellbeing asset the sooner
they are discovered.
Invention is a term which can be described as bringing ideas or objects together
in a way that did not exist before. If we assume that invention can be used to increase
wellbeing and we can say that a greater amount of wellbeing can be achieved for any
given invention if it happens sooner rather than later, then we can say that invention
sooner is better than later. This is true even if we don’t assume that invention can be
used to increase wellbeing and allows for evil inventions like the atom bomb and so on.
There is still an undoubted possibility for positive effects, so incentives based on
positive inventions is a way to skew the negative effects. You can argue that all it takes
is one terrible invention to do a demonstrable amount of bad, creating too many
negative effects. This argument can also be reversed as to be on the other end of the
spectrum, where there is such an invention that causes an overwhelming amount of
good and positive effects. This would again lead to the assumption that invention is
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better sooner rather than later. Ramsey recognizes the impact and value inventions can
have.
The probable increase of population constitutes a reason for
saving even more, and so does the possibility that future
inventions will put the bliss level higher than at present appears.
On the other hand, the probability that future inventions and
improvements in organization are likely to make income obtainable
with less sacrifice than at present is a reason for saving less. The
influence of inventions thus works in two opposite ways: they give
us new needs which we can better satisfy if we have saved up
beforehand, but they also increase our productive capacity and
make preliminary saving less urgent. (Ramsey 549)16
An important clarification, when he refers to saving, he is not talking about saving lives
but saving sums of money. The probable population increase he talks about can imply
that if we use a rate of zero to discount the probable, indefinitely increasing population
their wellbeing will get larger in comparison to the current generation. Ramsey states
that it's possible for inventions to put bliss (happiness and wellbeing) levels higher than
at the present. The second part of what he discusses is about the cost to inventions
from the perspective of spending one’s income. This can be thought of as, if invention
comes out and people pay the cost for it; the invention can improve people's lives. While
this is through the perspective of saving income it is useful in elaborating on the context
of patents being a societal cost to invention and so a cost to these perpetual wellbeing
assets.

16

In the paragraph after this he writes about negative rates not in terms of enjoyment or wellbeing but
large future costs.
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Patenting inventions as a cost to perpetually increasing wellbeing

Patents are a first step of making world Z, of the repugnant conclusion, desirable.
If we use patents as a cost to inventions happening sooner rather than later, then we
can see that patents are an incentive used for people who want to increase their
personal wellbeing. After an allotted amount of time, the patent expires; however, during
that time, the patent is a cost for the invention.
With medical inventions, the cost is the patent, and that cost can be extrapolated in a
few different ways, mainly through pricing and research and development costs. After
an invention happens and a patent is awarded, there are regulations to actualize that
invention. Development costs are to get the invention through the regulation and
approved for use. The process of going through the regulation can be time-consuming
on a patent. If the invention gets approved, it has limited time to use its patent protection
before it expires. This can be seen in the pricing of different drugs. To focus on what
was discussed earlier, diseases with small populations often have higher prices per
person (Drummond 338,339). Soliris costs between three hundred thousand and five
hundred thousand dollars per patient per year and are used to treat atypical hemolytic
uremic syndrome and generalized myasthenia gravis. It is considered among the most
expensive in the world. Not everyone has that much money to spend every year. This is
where insurance comes into the picture and can be thought of as a continuation of the
cost of the invention. The costs of rare disease drugs get mixed in with insurance
premiums, so you have a situation where people who are not getting the treatment and
do not know the recipient are paying into a system that pays for treatment. This

44

situation, the patent and its protection, act as a way to bring the invention into being
sooner rather than later.
The costs that then come from the patent are a byproduct of the cost of that
invention. It is very easy to get caught up with what happens during the duration of a
patent; however, it is essential to remember that the invention, once created, indefinitely
exists and so can also indefinitely increase wellbeing as a result. So, with the increase
of new inventions comes an increase in temporary costs for indefinite inventions.
This can help explain the inventions and innovations that are happening in
medicine with gene therapy and can serve as an example of the tension in the
repugnant conclusion. Gene therapy is a new approach to solving DNA mutation
problems. The problem with curing a DNA mutation is that there is a mutation causing
the disease replicated in every cell. How can you change it in every cell? One of the
ideas put forth is that we use an old enemy that can already do this for us, a virus. Gene
therapy is the use of a virus to change the mutated DNA in cells. There have been
many permutations to this; however, this is the basic idea of gene therapy.
The cost associated with gene therapy has been remarkably high, with
development costs being between one billion nine hundred million and five billion dollars
and pricing for the drug in the millions. (Loo 25) The results of gene therapy can be
curative. For example, the therapy for Hemophilia B, a rare disease, consists of blood
transfusions, which has an average price between two hundred thousand and three
hundred thousand dollars per year, or between four million to six million in total costs
given thirty to forty years as this disease is with you for life. Gene therapy would create
a lifetime cure having to avoid blood transfusions and yearly costs. If the pricing of that
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gene therapy was over one million dollars for the one-time treatment, then it is arguable
that you are saving costs. When we consider that the blood transfusion was patented,
then we have a situation where the cost of invention, a patent, is being circumvented by
a better invention and better patent. The blood transfusion and the patent associated
with it, are having initial potential cost negated.
In addition to the hemophilia example, the research that has been conducted to
show that was the problem and then this is the solution was indefinitely put out there. 17
In this case, the problem was that the people with hemophilia could not produce a
bleeding protein called factor IX. When this was found out, the solution was to put factor
IX into them through blood transfusions, and thus we have our first invention. Through
this first invention and the research behind it, there is also an indefinite proof of concept.
If we get B hemophiliacs factor IX, they can control their bleeding. This proof of concept
then goes to other inventions. What if we can make it so that they produce this factor IX
protein on their own? So, gene therapy was used and invented a new solution.
However, there is a remaining question of that cure’s price being offloaded onto
people who do not have hemophilia. The insurance system makes it so that it is
bearable to offload costs onto a pool of people. What if that cost becomes too high?
This scenario is not unimaginable. There are many rare genetic diseases. What if we
come to a point where we produce so much new treatment and cures for the people
with the diseases that the costs become very high for the public? Is there a point where
people won’t want to pay the costs? This leads us to a situation where you have tension

17

The problem was not having factor IX.
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between life being worth living and optimizing happiness. This is the utilitarian tension
that leads to the repugnant conclusion.
Through understanding these examples, we can resolve the repugnant
conclusion. The traditional solutions either distort or remove one of the two notions;
however, we need to accept the repugnant conclusion and those two principles in order
to solve it. If we have our world Z with its mass amount of unhappy people, we can say
that one of the goals of the world is to optimize happiness. If we say that this world and
the repugnant conclusion, in general, is an extrapolation of these tensions and these
tensions exist within us in time, we can also assume that world Z (if it can exist) would
exist in time.
The assumption leads to an answer when accepting the repugnant conclusion
that resolves the tension: when trying to optimize wellbeing overtime, innovation will
occur. There are more people, but this means that there are more people who fall under
the commonsense notions to optimize happiness. If people are unhappy, there is a
greater amount of people to invent or act to increase others’ wellbeing. Likewise, if
many people are dying or unhappy, there is now a greater number of people (who think
life is worth living) attempting to prevent that. Then because of the nature of perpetual
wellbeing assets improving wellbeing with inventions and having an indefinite solution,
World Z, overtime increases its wellbeing when accepting the two initial notions. When
comparing World Z to World A, there are fewer people to invent and fewer people to
innovate. World Z will end up being a preferable world in the long run compared to
World A. While this does not appear at first glance and can have given us a negative
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visual reaction when comparing the two, there is an inevitable march towards increasing
wellbeing that Parfit seemed to overlook.
The best solution to the repugnant conclusion is to accept it and to realize that it
is not so repugnant as it initially seems. As the population increases so comes an
increase in innovation. For world Z, there are so many people that someone will move
to optimize and increase happiness as per the original notion. Similarly, because of the
vast amount of people, suddenly, there are more opportunities to increase your own
happiness. If the original notion is to assume that we want to optimize happiness, then
we must also concede that people will try to optimize happiness in the world. There are
inherently more incentives to increasing happiness in world Z than in World A. With a
larger population also comes a greater chance for people to invent and the ability to
innovate into increasing wellbeing. The notion that world Z is not worse than A is
counter-intuitive; however, if world Z were to operate in space and time, they would be
more innovative than world A. This is acceptance of the repugnant conclusion which will
lead us into how we balance valuing future wellbeing.
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A social contract to innovate
Switching to a more descriptive mode will help to emphasize how innovation is
thought of in a market and further our understanding of the solution. In a market-based
system you can have a trustless system. You don’t have to trust people to work in your
interests. If the desired outcome is to increase wellbeing, innovation, create value, or
whatever phrase you want to use, you can have a trustless system that, in order to
profit, people have to be reciprocal and accept your increase in wellbeing. If someone is
self-interested and wants to increase their own wellbeing, they have to do so in a way
that creates value or increases your wellbeing. This is a kind of social contract. It can
sometimes be referred to as a double thank you, and this is the market society. The
concept of a double thank you is when you buy something like food or a hat, you give
them the money, and then they give you the food or hat, and you say thank you, and
they say thank you as well, a double thank you.
This is done because it is a voluntary transaction. So in a market with voluntary
transactions, a transaction does not have to occur. Someone doesn’t have to buy
something if they don’t want to. Likewise, someone doesn’t have to sell something.
These two things are what make a market system. The point of this market system is
that we all choose to use it.
In the case of diseases, you have a system where someone wants to sell
something. If someone patents it and they go through the regulatory approvals, then
you have one side that wants to sell something, and you have another side, which can
easily be seen as less consensual. Especially with deadly diseases, that is, if you want
to have this drug or disease treatment, you have to buy from the guy who’s selling.
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These seemingly create these single seller monopolies. You have someone who wants
to sell and someone who needs to buy. These monopolies are temporary as they end
when the temporary patent to the drug has expired. After a patent is done, then it
becomes allowed for the market to pick it up and produce it.
So, this isn’t a market system, but it can be, and this is where the valuing of
future generations comes in if you value future generations highly— getting a patent for
that disease sooner rather than later is kind of like a handshake. If we imagine the worst
possible treatment of these people then they could exploit those people temporarily.
The buyers have temporarily no choice. And that is an exchange for an indefinite
increase in wellbeing. If that’s the case, it is a clock ticking until it gets put in a market
system. If the sellers want to sell it, they have to go through regulatory approval, so if
someone goes through regulatory approval with their invention, they have intentions to
sell it. When they go through the regulatory approval, and it gets approved and is safe
for use, then they could sell it at inflated prices to insurance companies, however, only
for a limited time before anyone can make it.
Once that patent expires, you can then consider it an open market and not
monopolistic. So, the value of the open market is there. It’s just being moved forward
until after the patent life, and it’s being done in exchange for innovation and treatments.
The system, arguably, allows people to temporarily exploit people and then after that is
done, the drug will have an indefinite market life. So, the idea of a handshake or
traditional kind of market system is not lost. It’s not non-existent in this circumstance,
but it is instead moved back as a cost to bring it to market. That could only be done by
devaluing the current generation.
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Now, there is a question of whether the current generation can handle it? It canthrough insurance companies and through the kind of inflated prices system that we
discussed earlier.18 The insurance systems are set up to be able to handle it, to be able
to get someone who does not have a million dollars a million-dollar treatment.
The average person with the disease will not have a million dollars to get the
treatment. So, you have insurance companies that are able to lend a hand. This is all
done through an effort of; we need to devalue the future generation to get out of this.
The tension of balancing valuing future and current wellbeing; an appeal to innovation
allows you to move right through it. So, in a sense, these patents and the costs
associated with innovation are like a double thank you to future generations.

18

Implication of valuing future generations highly.
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Precision Medicine as an example of innovation solving a repugnant
conclusion
Precision medicine is an example of the innovation that comes out of accepting
the repugnant conclusion. Precision medicine is the identification of a cause of a
specific problem in the body and then being able to solve that problem with tailored
medicine. (National Research 38) 19 The introduction of precision medicine and its
relation to rare diseases is one of the reasons we can deduce such a conclusion to the
repugnant conclusion. The use of precision therapies allows for a perpetual increase in
wellbeing in places where there was no increase before. 20
These inventions are being incentivized to be created. They can have a
perpetual increase to wellbeing when we assume an indefinite population growth.
Through the potential for a perpetual increase to wellbeing we can say that a bearable
decrease in wellbeing is justified because of the amount of people that can exist from it
in the future. Those people existing will also mean that they will have an increase in
wellbeing from not being seemingly doomed to misery or death. As this progresses over
time, we can expect that diseases that do not have treatments will gradually get
treatments. Even for diseases that have smaller populations. Being able to precisely
identify the problem for a small population while having existing ways to deal with that
problem shows a solution to rare diseases.21

19

This definition is inferred from the example given in this text.
An example of a perpetual wellbeing asset could be, ASO therapy, Gene therapy, Gene Editing,
PROTAC, and RNAi. Once these inventions are known they have the potential to increase wellbeing
exponentially.
21 An example of this is finding a specific DNA mutation and using the examples in the previous footnote
to arrive at a treatment.
20
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This mode of thinking is a justifiable way of existing in the repugnant conclusion.
In the repugnant conclusion, if world Z were to exist than it is probable that the valuing
of life and optimizing of happiness over time would lead to a better world than before.22
We are able to see this as probable, with the emergence of innovations like precision
medicine.

22

The before is world A of the repugnant conclusion.
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Conclusion
My argument can be broken into two parts. The first is a kind of contradiction or
tension in how we view current and future generations. Rare diseases are an example
of this. The contradiction is, when you want to lower drug prices and profits, then you
are lowering incentives and valuing the current generations highly. When we imply that
we want to value the current generation highly, we put ourselves opposed to valuing the
future generation highly. We cannot value current generations highly while
simultaneously valuing future generations highly. It is a contradiction to do both at once.
We can see examples of how we balance future wellbeing by looking at the
incentives in place. The main issue with this balance is that it is at the cost of the current
generation. Patents come at the cost to incentivize invention and innovation. If you try to
devalue future wellbeing, then you’re taking away incentives to innovate for that future
generation. The recognition of that kind of conflict and tension, to value future
generations and also devalue the incentive to grow, is the first part of my argument. So,
implying a high value to future generations and a high value to current generations is
contradictory because in order to value future generations highly, you have to devalue
current generations. If innovation happens at the expense of present wellbeing and the
goal is the increase of future wellbeing, then you end up in a situation which is the same
as the repugnant conclusion. Any loss in the quality of the current wellbeing can be
made up for with the amount of people you get to save in the future. If you have to ask
people to not get treatment in the future, then you are struggling with life is worth living
and optimizing your current happiness. A justification for how we can balance this
problem can be found in utilitarianism, which is the second part of my argument.
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The repugnant conclusion is the main challenge to a utilitarian justification,
however, by solving that tension; we can also resolve the initial tension of valuing future
wellbeing highly. This solution can be showcased by a solution being expressed in an
instantiation of the repugnant conclusion, rare diseases. An appeal to innovation is a
method that can allow us to solve problems such as the rare disease problem. The way
it gets its value is through these systems set up like patents and insurance that
happened at the cost of current generations. It is the person who is trying to get an
opportunity to increase their current wellbeing and the current generation that this kind
of innovation comes about. So, we could circumvent that initial tension by moving
through it- not by going to one or the other, but by instead accepting both. By moving
through the tension, we resolve it and solve the problem. There will be a devaluing of
the current generation, however, the current generation’s devaluation comes at the
actions of people trying to increase the value to themselves and so trying to increase
the value to the current generation. So, through this increase to the value of the current
generation, we have this innate value of future generations. This understanding
releases the tension and is my proposed solution to the repugnant conclusion. Which as
we can now see is not so repugnant.
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